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Abstract
In this paper we intend to discuss the importance of providing a physi-
cal representation of quantum superpositions which goes beyond the mere
reference to mathematical structures and measurement outcomes. This
proposal goes in the opposite direction of the orthodox project which at-
tempts to “bridge the gap” between the quantum formalism and common
sense “classical reality” —precluding, right from the start, the possibility
of interpreting quantum superpositions through non-classical notions. We
will argue that in order to restate the problem of interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics in truly ontological terms we require a radical revision
of the problems and definitions addressed within the orthodox literature.
On the one hand, we will discuss the need of providing a formal redefini-
tion of superpositions which captures their contextual character. On the
other hand, we attempt to replace the focus on the measurement prob-
lem, which concentrates on the justification of measurement outcomes
from “weird” superposed states, and introduce the superposition problem
which concentrates instead on the conceptual representation of superpo-
sitions themselves. In this respect, after presenting three necessary con-
ditions for objective physical representation, we will provide arguments
which show why the classical (actualist) representation of physics faces
severe difficulties to solve the superposition problem. Finally, we will also
argue that, if we are willing to abandon the (metaphysical) presupposition
according to which ‘Actuality = Reality’, then there is plenty of room to
construct a conceptual representation for quantum superpositions.
Keywords: quantum superposition, physical reality, measurement problem.
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Introduction
Quantum superpositions are being used today in laboratories all around the
world in order to create the most outstanding technological and experimental
developments of the last centuries. Indeed, quantum computation, quantum
teleportation, quantum cryptography and the like technologies are opening up
an amazing range of possibilities for the near future. This new quantum techno-
logical era is founded on one of the main principles of QuantumMechanics (QM),
the so called superposition principle—which in turn gives rise to quantum super-
positions and entanglement. However, while many experimentalists are showing
that Schrödinger’s cats are growing fat [7], and it becomes increasingly clear
that quantum superpositions are telling us something about quantum physical
reality even at the macroscopic scale [44, 42], the philosophy of science com-
munity has not been capable of providing a coherent physical representation of
them. In the orthodox literature —apart from expensive metaphysical solution
provided by many worlds interpretations which claim we live in a “superposi-
tion of many worlds” or “multiverse”1— there is no conceptual explanation of
the physical meaning of quantum superpositions which goes beyond the formal
reference to a mathematical structure or the empirical reference to measurement
outcomes.
In this paper, we will argue that the reason for the lack of conceptual analysis
regarding quantum superpositions is directly related to the exclusive emphasis
that has been given in the orthodox literature to the infamous measurement
problem. Taking as a standpoint a representational realist stance, we will argue
for the need to replace the measurement problem, which only focuses on the
justification of observable measurement outcomes, by the superposition prob-
lem, which concentrates instead on the conceptual account of the mathematical
expression itself. In order to discuss the possibility of interpreting superposi-
tions we will present three necessary conditions which attempt to constrain any
objective conceptual representation of an empirically adequate mathematical
formalism. Our analysis will require a formal redefinition of the notion of quan-
tum superposition which considers not only the meaningful physical statements
that can be derived from them, but also their contextual character as basis-
dependent formal elements of the theory. Taking into account our proposed
three necessary conditions for the objective representation of physical reality,
we will provide arguments which show the severe difficulties faced by the classi-
cal (actualist) representation of physics to produce a conceptual interpretation
of quantum superpositions. In the final part of the paper, we will also argue
that, if we are willing to discuss the possibility that ‘Quantum Physical Reality
6= Actuality’, then there is plenty of room to represent quantum superpositions
in terms of (non-actual) physical reality.
1See for example [54]. We leave the analysis of quantum superpositions in many worlds
interpretation for a future work.
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1 The Representational Realist Stance
Within philosophy of physics, realism has been characterized as a stance which
assumes the existence of a reality independent of the actions of any human
subject or conscious being. In short, it is claimed that realism is committed
to the belief of an objective (subject independent) reality. However, we will
argue that this account remains insufficient when attempting to grasp the praxis
of realist physicists themselves. Representational realism attempts to capture
exactly this aspect; i.e., the specific way through which realist physicists produce
such representational (meta-physical) account of reality. In this respect, the
main presupposition of representational realism is that physical theories relate
to reality, not only through their mathematical formalisms, but also through a
network or structure of physical concepts.
The coherent interrelation between mathematical structures and physical
notions allows physical theories to represent (in various ways) the world and
reality; it allows the physicist to imagine different physical phenomena. For
example, in Newtonian mechanics the notions of space, time, inertia, particle,
force, mass, etc., are related to infinitesimal calculus in such a way that we
physicists are capable to imagine and predict very different phenomena which
range from the motion of planets to the free fall of an apple from a tree. But
infinitesimal calculus does not wear Newton’s physical notions on its sleeves.
There is no notion of ‘inertia’, of ‘particle’ or ‘absolute space’ which can be
read off the formalism of the theory. Mathematical equations do not posses, by
themselves, physical concepts. Space’, ‘time’, ‘particle’, etc. are not —according
to our stance— “self evident” givens of experience; they are concepts that have
been developed by physicists and philosophers through many centuries.2
Every theory possesses its own specific set of physical notions and math-
ematical equations. As we all know, Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory has a
mathematical structure and set of concepts different to that of classical me-
chanics and Einstein’s relativity theory. The fact that theories share the same
names for distinct physical concepts should not confuse us, their meaning in
many cases differ radically. As remarked by Heisenberg [33, pp. 97-98]: “New
phenomena that had been observed could only be understood by new concepts
which were adapted to the new phenomena. [...] These new concepts again
could be connected in a closed system. [...] This problem arose at once when
the theory of special relativity had been discovered. The concepts of space and
time belonged to both Newtonian mechanics and to the theory of relativity.
But space and time in Newtonian mechanics were independent; in the theory
of relativity they were connected.” From this acknowledgment, the representa-
tional realist argues that the task of a realist physicist or philosopher of physics
must be the creation of a closed theory which coherently interrelates the specific
mathematical formalism, the particular physical concepts and the phenomena
described by that theory.
2See for example, in this same respect, the detailed analysis of the concept of space in the
history of physics provided by Max Jammer in his excellent book: The Concepts of Space.
The History of Theories of Space in Physics [37].
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According to our representational realist stance, which will be presupposed
through the rest of the paper, ‘experimental data’ and ‘observability’ should be
regarded only in terms of a confirmation procedure about the empirical adequacy
(or not) of a given theory. Our realist stance —which relates to Heisenberg’s
closed theory approach3 and some of the main elements of Einstein’s philos-
ophy of physics— assumes that physical observation is both theoretically and
metaphysically laden. In this respect, the basic principles of classical logic and
metaphysics, namely, the Principle of Existence (PE), the Principle of Identity
(PI) and the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC) determine, right from the
start, the possibilities and limits of classical observation itself. Classical observa-
tion is both defined and constrained by these ontological and logical principles.
Identities or non-contradictory properties are not something we find “outside
in the world”, they are instead the basic conditions of possibility for discussing
about any object of experience. Exactly the same point was made already by
Hume himself regarding the physical notion of causality. As we all know, causa-
tion is not something grounded empirically, it is never found in the observable
world. Rather, as Hume clearly exposed, it is a metaphysical presupposition
which allows us to make sense of physical phenomena.
PE, PNC and PI have been, not only the fundamental cornerstones of both
Aristotle’s metaphysics and classical logic itself, but also the main principles
behind the physical picture imposed by Newton’s classical mechanics (see [52]).
The idea of “classical reality”, which encompasses the whole of classical physics
(including relativity), can be condensed in the notion of Actual State of Affairs
(ASA).4 This particular (metaphysical) representation was developed by New-
ton and can be formulated in terms of systems constituted by a set of actual
(definite valued) preexistent properties. Objects and its properties are intrinsi-
cally defined through PE, PNC and PI as existents in the actual mode of being.
In the 18th century these same principles constituted the basis for the meta-
physical definition of the notion of actual entity in classical physics. Newton
conceived a Universe constituted by bodies with always definite valued (actual)
properties. This allowed Laplace to imagine a demon which, given the complete
and exact knowledge of all particles in the Universe (i.e., the set of all actual
properties), would have access through the equations of motion to the future
and the past of the whole Universe.
Physical representation allows us to think about experience and predict phe-
nomena without the need of performing any actual measurement. It allows us to
imagine physical reality beyond the here and now. This is of course the opposite
standpoint from empiricists who argue instead that the fundament of physics is
‘actual experimental data’. As remarked by van Fraassen [51, pp. 202-203]: “To
develop an empiricist account of science is to depict it as involving a search for
truth only about the empirical world, about what is actual and observable.” In
this case, “actual” has a very different meaning to the one just mentioned above.
It is understood as making reference to hic et nunc observations (by subjects)
3For a detailed discussion of the closed theory approach see [8, 16].
4See [18] for discussion and definition of this notion in the context of classical physics.
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and not to the Aristotelian metaphysical definition of a mode of existence (in-
dependent of subjects). While the empiricist considers that the construction of
theories always begins from observable data, the representational realist recog-
nizes that theory construction is an entangled process of production of concepts,
mathematical structures and fields of phenomena.
Contrary to the positivist-empiricist stance according to which observables
in physics must be accepted as givens of experience, the representational realist
considers observability as both theoretically and metaphysically laden. For her,
the conceptual scheme is a necessary condition to produce not only the physical
representation of a closed theory but also the condition of possibility to provide
a categorical description of the (closed) physical phenomena discussed by that
theory. The task of both physicists and philosophers is to jointly construct new
mathematical formalisms and networks of physical concepts which allows us to
imagine new physical phenomena.
According to our stance, the subject must play no role at all in the description
of physical reality. As Einstein [21, p. 175] made the point: “[...] it is the purpose
of theoretical physics to achieve understanding of physical reality which exists
independently of the observer, and for which the distinction between ‘direct
observable’ and ‘not directly observable’ has no ontological significance” even
though “the only decisive factor for the question whether or not to accept a
particular physical theory is its empirical success.” For the representational
realist, empirical adequacy is part of a verification procedure, not that which
“needs to be saved”. Following Einstein’s dictum which allowed Heisenberg to
derive his indeterminacy relations “It is only the theory which decides what we
can observe” [34, p. 63]. The theory allows us to describe what is observable.
It is not, as argued by empiricists, the other way around.
This understanding of observability as being theoretically and metaphysi-
cally dependent goes not only against empiricism and instrumentalism but also
against scientific realism itself. As Musgrave [10, p. 1221] explains: “In tradi-
tional discussions of scientific realism, common sense realism regarding tables
and chairs (or the moon) is accepted as unproblematic by both sides. Attention
is focused on the difficulties of scientific realism regarding ‘unobservables’ like
electrons.” The main danger of all these philosophical positions —namely, scien-
tific realism, empiricism and instrumentalism— is that they close the door to the
development of new physical representations, since they assume that we already
know what reality is in terms of the (naive) observation of tables and chairs
—also known as “classical reality”. ‘Tables’ and ‘chairs’ are naively considered
as “common sense” givens of experience and represented by mathematical mod-
els. Within these philosophical positions, contrary to representational realism,
there is no reference whatsoever to metaphysical considerations regarding the
meaning of ‘tables’ and ‘chairs’. The orthodox project is then focused in trying
“to bridge the gap” between the strange quantum formalism and “classical real-
ity” [26]. They attempt to do so, forgetting that our present “common sense”
understanding of the world was also part of a creative process —and not the
final conditions of human understanding.
Empirically adequate mathematical structures are not enough to produce
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a meaningful physical representation of reality. Physics cannot be exclusively
reduced to mathematical models which predict measurement outcomes simply
because neither mathematical models nor empirical facts contain in themselves
the physical concepts the theory talks about. The experience of looking to a
‘chair’ or a ‘table’ does not produce by itself PI or PNC. There are no physical
notions to be found within mathematical models either. Every physical theory
is intrinsically constituted through specific physical concepts which are defined
in metaphysical terms —through specific principles. It is only through these
representation that the experience described by a physical theory is made pos-
sible. As Heisenberg [35, p. 264] makes the point: “The history of physics is
not only a sequence of experimental discoveries and observations, followed by
their mathematical description; it is also a history of concepts. For an under-
standing of the phenomena the first condition is the introduction of adequate
concepts. Only with the help of correct concepts can we really know what has
been observed.”
Representational Realism: A representational realist account of a physical
theory must be capable of providing a physical representation of reality in terms
of a network of physical concepts which coherently relates to the mathematical
formalism of the theory and allows to articulate and make predictions of definite
phenomena. Observability in physics is always theoretically and metaphysically
laden, and thus, it must be regarded as a consequence of each particular physical
representation.
2 Representing Quantum Physical Reality
For the representational realist, the task of both physicists and philosophers of
physics is to produce conceptual representations which allow us to grasp the
features of the Universe beyond mathematical schemes and measurement out-
comes. In order to provide such representation we must necessarily complement
mathematical formalisms with networks of physical concepts. It is simply not
enough to claim that “according to QM the structure of the world is like Hilbert
space”, or that “reality, according to QM is described through the quantum wave
function”. That is just mixing the formal and conceptual levels of discourse (see
for discussion [18, Section 4]). That is not doing the job of providing a con-
ceptual physical representation in the sense discussed above. Mathematics is
simply incapable of producing physical concepts.
If we accept the representational realist challenge and we are willing to dis-
cuss the conceptual meaning of QM, there seems to be two main very general
lines of research to consider. The first one is to investigate the possibility that
QM makes reference to the same physical representation provided by classical
physics; i.e. that it talks about an ASA —or in other words, about “classical re-
ality”. This is the main idea behind, for example, the hidden variables program
which, as noticed by Bacciagaluppi [6, p. 74], attempts to “restore a classical
way of thinking about what there is.” This attempt has been faced with severe
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difficulties, mainly due to the empirical test of Bell inequalities, Kochen-Specker
theorem, the infamous measurement problem, and the list continues. Due to
the impossibility to account for a non-contextual classical representation, this
line of research has abandoned the orthodox formalism and proposed instead
new variants which attempt to rescue “classical reality”. The second line is to
consider the possibility that QM might describe physical reality in a different
—maybe even incommensurable— way to that of classical physics. It is this
very different, second line of research, that interests us in this paper.
In order to discuss and analyze physical interpretations we need to agree on
the definition of Meaningful Operational Statements (MOS) within a theory.
Definition 2.1 Meaningful Operational Statements: Every operational
statement within a theory capable of predicting the outcomes of possible mea-
surements must be considered as meaningful with respect to the representation
of physical reality provided by that theory.
From a realist perspective MOS must be related, in the final stage of a theory
construction, to the representation of reality provided by the theory. The intu-
ition behind this requirement is remarked by Griffiths [30, p. 361]: “If a theory
makes a certain amount of sense and gives predictions which agree reasonably
well with experimental or observational results, scientists are inclined to be-
lieve that its logical and mathematical structure reflects the structure of the
real world in some way, even if philosophers will remain permanently skeptical.”
As we argued above, the representation must be established not only in for-
mal mathematical terms but also in conceptual terms through the introduction
of appropriate physical notions. MOS are predictive statements about specific
physical situations. It is the task of both physicists and philosophers of physics
to complement MOS with adequate physical notions, allowing us to construct
a coherent conceptual and categorical representation which allows us to explain
what is exactly going on within the addressed phenomenon.
The problem introduced by QM is that, even though we possess MOS such
as, for example, ‘the spin of the quantum particle is + with probability 0.5’ or
‘the atom has a probability of decaying of 0.7’, we do not possess an adequate set
of concepts that would allow us to grasp the physical content of these statements
—not in the same way as we do in Newton’s mechanics or Maxwell’s theory. Let
us be clear about this point, in QM we do not understand conceptually what is
the meaning of ‘quantum particle’, ‘spin’, ‘atom’ or ‘probability’. Unlike classi-
cal mechanics, until today we cannot picture what is gong on according to QM.
When asked about such notions we can only provide a mathematical explana-
tion or recall the predictive empirical success of the theory. But prediction is
not explanation. Neither is mathematical formalization. Prediction and formal-
ization do not allow us to imagine what these “quantum notions” refer to —as
we do in classical physical theories.
In order to come up with a conceptual representation which explains the
MOS of a theory, the produced physical discourse must allow for Counterfac-
tual Reasoning (CR). This is a necessary condition for without counterfactual
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discourse there is no true possibility of a subject independent representation of
reality. CR is used and analyzed by different disciplines. In the case of logi-
cians and philosophers, CR is studied in terms of Kripke semantics, or possible
worlds semantics. Even though this logical approach to counterfactuals has be-
come popular in philosophy of QM (e.g. [30]), it has never been popular among
physicists in general. In fact, physicists have always used counterfactuals in
a rather (undefined) intuitive way in order to discuss physical experience as
related to an objective description of reality. Let us provide thus a general defi-
nition of counterfactual reasoning which attempts to consider the actual praxis
of physicists themselves.
Definition 2.2 Counterfactual Reasoning: If the theory is empirically
adequate then the MOS it provides must be related to physical reality through a
conceptual scheme. The possibility to make MOS related to an objective physical
representation requires necessarily a counterfactual discourse. MOS are not
necessarily statements about future events, they can be also statements about
past and present events. CR about MOS comprises all actual and non-actual
physical experience. CR is the objectivity condition for the possibility of physical
discourse.
CR is an indispensable element for the physical discourse of a theory which
attempts to discuss an objective representation of physical reality. Many of
the most important debates in the history of physics are thought experiments
which make explicit use of counterfactual discourse. In the 18th century, Newton
and Leibniz imagined different physical situations in order to draw conclusions
about classical mechanics. At the beginning of the 20th century, Einstein’s fa-
mous Gedankenexperiments in relativity theory made clear that the notion of
simultaneity in Newtoninan mechanics had to be reconsidered, producing a rev-
olution in our understanding of space and time. During the 1920s Solvay meet-
ings, Bohr and Einstein discussed in depth many Gedankenexperiments related
to QM. Some years later, Schrödinger imagined a strange situation in which a
(quantum) cat was ‘dead’ and ‘alive’ at the same time. More than 50 years had
to pass by in order to empirically test the existence of quantum superpositions
allowing technicians and experimentalists to explore amazing possibilities for
quantum information processing. Also Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen and Bell had
to wait till the 80s for Aspect and his group in order to be certain that the hid-
den variable project —with which they wanted to replace QM by a “complete
theory”— was not going to work out without giving up either reality or locality.
These few examples show the crucial role played by conceptual representation
and CR within the praxis of physicists.
If we assume a representational realist stance, the conceptual representation
must be capable of conceptually explaining the MOS produced by the theory,
it must also produce a discourse which respects CR. Without CR in physical
discourse one cannot imagine objective reality nor experience beyond the here
and now. Of course, this might not be regarded as a problem for an empiricist.
CR allows us to state that “if I performed this (or that) experiment” then —if it
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is, of course, a MOS— the physical theory would tell me that “the outcome will
be x (or y)”, and I do not need to actually perform the experiment! I know what
the result will be independently of performing the experiment or not. And that
is the whole point of being a realist about physics, that I trust the theory to
be talking about a physical representation of reality of which I can make sense
without making any reference to the hic et nunc observation of a subject.
Physicists are accustomed to play with the counterfactual statements pro-
duced by a theory. CR in physical discourse has nothing to do with time, evo-
lution nor dynamics, it has to do with the possibility of representing objective
physical reality and experience. A physical theory allows me to make counter-
factual statements about the future, the present or the past, just in the same
way physical invariance in classical mechanics connects the multiple frames of
reference without anyone actually being in any of them. CR is the discursive
condition with respect to the objective physical description of phenomena. In-
deed, in classical mechanics (or relativity theory), we do not need to actually be
in a specific frame of reference to know what will happen in that specific frame,
or a different one. We can imagine and calculate what will happen in each frame,
we can physically represent them to ourselves and translate what will happen
in each of them through the Galilean (or Lorentz) transformations. And this
makes explicit use of CR. For a realist, the possibility to imagine reality is the
magic of physics. Once we believe to have an empirically adequate theory, we
realists —contrary to empiricists— still have a lot of work to do, we still need
to produce a representation of what the theory is talking about. And exactly
that, is what is lacking in the case of QM.
We physicist can imagine how a distant star will collapse and transform into
a white dwarf many, many years from now; we can also understand what would
happen to space and time when traveling on a ray of light; or the tremendous
consequences of what could happen to us inside a back hole; we can even discuss
what already happened 13.800 million years ago during the first minutes of the
Universe after the Big Bang, long before any conscious being existed. It is
the trust in the physical representations provided by different theories which
allows physicists to imagine situations which escape not only the spacial region
in which they live, but also the technical possibilities of their time. And that
is the reason why, as Einstein remarked, imagination is more important than
knowledge.
From the previous analysis, we propose the following three necessary condi-
tions for producing an objective physical representation of a theory:
Necessary Condition 1 (NC1). Every physical theory must be capable of
producing MOS which can be empirically tested.
Necessary Condition 2 (NC2). Every MOS the theory produces must be
directly related to the representation of physical reality, provided through a
specific conceptual scheme which adequately explains the phenomenon.
Necessary Condition 3 (NC3). The conceptual representation of a phys-
ical theory must be capable of producing a coherent counterfactual physical
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discourse which includes all MOS of the theory.
In QM, the complementarity scheme produced by Bohr violates explicitly CR
making impossible to provide an objective representation. As we have dis-
cussed elsewhere [16], the orthodox Bohrian scheme faces severe difficulties in
this respect. The demand to provide a realist conceptual representation of QM
implies not only a different perspective, it also presupposes the consideration of
new problems. That will be discussed in the following section.
3 The Superposition Problem: Representation
Beyond Actual Outcomes
The orthodox line of research deals with a specific set of problems which ana-
lyze QM from a classical perspective. This means that all problems assume as
a standpoint “classical reality” and only reflect about the formalism in “nega-
tive terms”; that is, in terms of the failure of QM to account for the classical
representation of reality and the use of its concepts: separability, space, time,
locality, individuality, identity, actuality, etc. The “negative” problems are thus:
non-separability, non-locality, non-individuality, non-identity, etc.5 These “no-
problems” begin their analysis considering the notions of classical physics, as-
suming implicitly as a standpoint the strong metaphysical presupposition that
QM should be able to represent physical reality in terms of such classical no-
tions. The most famous of all interpretational problems of QM, is the so called
“measurement problem”.
Measurement Problem: Given a specific basis (or context), QM describes
mathematically a quantum state in terms of a superposition of, in general, mul-
tiple states. Since the evolution described by QM allows us to predict that the
quantum system will get entangled with the apparatus and thus its pointer po-
sitions will also become a superposition,6 the question is why do we observe a
single outcome instead of a superposition of them?
The measurement problem is also a way of discussing the quantum formalism
in “negative terms”. In this case, the problem concentrates in the justification
of observable measurement outcomes. It should be remarked that the mea-
surement problem presupposes that the basis (or context) —directly related
to a measurement set up— has been already determined (or fixed). Thus it
should be clear that there is no question regarding the contextual character
5I am grateful to Bob Coecke for this linguistic insight. Cagliari, July 2014.
6Given a quantum system represented by a superposition of more than one term,
∑
ci|αi〉,
when in contact with an apparatus ready to measure, |R0〉, QM predicts that system and
apparatus will become “entangled” in such a way that the final ‘system + apparatus’ will be
described by
∑
ci|αi〉|Ri〉. Thus, as a consequence of the quantum evolution, the pointers
have also become —like the original quantum system— a superposition of pointers
∑
ci|Ri〉.
This is why the measurement problem can be stated as a problem only in the case the original
quantum state is described by a superposition of more than one term.
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of the theory within this specific problem. As we have argued extensively in
[17], the measurement problem has nothing to do with contextuality. The prob-
lem raises when, within a definite basis, the actualization process is considered.
There is then a mix of subjective and objective elements when the recording of
the experiment takes place —as Wigner and his friend clearly explained. The
problem here is coherency between the physical representation provided when
the measurement was not yet performed, and the system is described in terms
of a quantum superposition; and when we claim that “we have observed a single
measurement outcome”, which is not described by the theory. Since there is
no physical representation of “the collapse”, the subject (or his friend) seems
to define it explicitly. The mixture of objective and subjective is due to an
incomplete description of the state of affairs within the quantum measurement
process (or “collapse”).
The focus of the measurement problem is the hic et nunc actual realm of
experience. In this sense, the measurement problem is an empiricist problem
which presupposes the controversial idea that actual observation is perfectly
well defined in QM. But from a representational realist stance things must be
analyzed in a radically different perspective. Indeed, here it is only the theory
which can tell you what can be observed. This means that if we are willing to
truly investigate the physical representation of quantum superpositions then we
need to “invert” the measurement problem and focus on the formal-conceptual
level —instead of trying to justify what we observe in “common sense” classical
terms. This means that the attention should be focused on the conceptual
representation of the mathematical expression itself instead of attempting to
somehow “save” the measurement outcomes justifying through ad hoc rules the
“collapse” of the quantum superposition to one of its terms.
The important developments we are witnessing today in quantum informa-
tion processing demands us, philosophers of QM, to pay special attention to the
novel requirements of this new technological era. In this respect, we believe that
a task of outmost importance is to produce a coherent physical representation
of quantum superpositions.
Superposition Problem: Given a situation in which there is a quantum su-
perposition of more than one term,
∑
ci |αi〉, and given the fact that each one
of the terms relates trough the Born rule to a MOS, the question is how do
we conceptually represent this mathematical expression? Which is the physical
notion that relates to each one of the terms in a quantum superposition?
The superposition problem opens the possibility to truly discuss a physical rep-
resentation of reality which goes beyond the classical representation of physics in
terms of a Newtonian ASA, or its mere reference to measurement outcomes and
mathematical structures. We are convinced that without a replacement of the
measurement problem by the superposition problem, there is no true possibility
of discussing an interpretation of QM which provides an objective non-classical
physical representation of reality. We know of no reasons to believe that this is
not doable.
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4 Contextual Formal Redefinition of Quantum
Superpositions
Both the measurement and the superposition problems imply the necessary re-
quirement that the formal definition of a quantum superposition is contextually
specified. The fact that a quantum state Ψ can be mathematically represented
in multiple bases must be explicitly considered within such definition. This ob-
vious remark might be regarded as controversial due to the fact the contextual
character of quantum superpositions has been completely overseen within the
orthodox literature. As we have discussed in detail in [12], the semantic interpre-
tation used in order to interpret the syntactical level of the quantum formalism
presupposes implicitly PE, PNC and PI. This “common sense” classical inter-
pretation has been uncritically accepted without the necessary consideration of
the coherency between the addressed semantical and syntactical levels of the
theory.
Another consequence of this classical-type semantical interpretation is the
complete omission of the obvious distinction between two different levels of
mathematical representation present within the orthodox formalism. Indeed,
the use of notions of ‘system’, ‘state’ and ‘property’ has camouflaged the im-
portant distinction between, on the one hand, an abstract vector, Ψ, and on the
other, its different basis-dependent representations,
∑
ci |αi〉. Let us remark
again that this distinction is already implicit within the measurement problem
itself. The measurement problem requires the necessary specification of the par-
ticular basis in which the state is represented as a linear combination of terms.
Thus, in order to make explicit these two different formal levels, we state now
the following contextual definition of quantum superpositions:
Definition 4.1 Quantum Superposition: Given a quantum state, Ψ, each
i-basis defines a particular mathematical representation of Ψ,
∑
ci |αi〉, which
we call a quantum superposition. Each one of these different basis dependent
quantum superpositions defines a specific set of MOS. These MOS are related to
each one of the terms of the particular quantum superposition through the Born
rule. The notion of quantum superposition is contextual for it is always defined
in terms of a particular experimental context (or basis).
The contextual character of quantum superpositions is an aspect of outmost
importance when attempting to conceptually represent them. Let us discuss an
explicit example in order to clarify these ideas. Consider a typical Stern-Gerlach
type experiment where we have produced a quantum state Φ mathematically
represented in the x-basis by the ket | ↑x>. This can be easily done by filtering
off the states | ↓x> of a Stern-Gerlach arranged in the x-direction. It is a
mathematical fact that the state can be represented in different bases which
diagonalyze a complete set of commuting observables. Each basis-dependent
representation of the sate Φ is obviously different when considering its physical
content. Indeed, it is common to the praxis of physicists to relate each different
basis with a specific measurement context.
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The notion of basis, and thus also of superposition as we defined it above,
possesses a physical content which relates a specific set of epistemic inquiries
regarding the abstract state Φ to a set of MOS which provide an answer to each
specific question. In our example, we know that if we measure Φ in the context
given by the x-basis we will observe with certainty ‘spin up’. Thus, the MOS
related to the | ↑x> is of course: “if the SG is in the x-direction then the result
will be ‘+’ with certainty (probability = 1)”.
Physicists are taught that if they want to learn what are the possible out-
comes in a different context, for example if they turn the SG to the y-direction,
then they just need to write the state | ↑x> in the y-basis. Through this change
of basis, and according to our previous definition, physicists obtain a different
quantum superposition: cy1| ↑y> + cy2| ↓y>. Writing the state in the y-basis
produces a new superposition which relates to the following two MOS. The first
one is that “if the SG is in the y-direction then the result will be ‘+’ with proba-
bility |cy1|2”. The second MOS is: “if the SG is in the y-direction then the result
will be ‘-’ with probability |cy2|2”. The same will happen with any i-context of
inquiry (determined by a particular i-basis), each one of them will be related to
a particular quantum superposition ci1| ↑i> + ci2| ↓i> and a specific set of MOS
arising from it. Following NC1, all these different context-dependent MOS can
be tested and provide empirical content to each one of the different superposi-
tions. Thus, according to our NC2 and NC3, each one of these particular MOS
must be related to physical reality through a conceptual physical representation
which respects counterfactual discourse and reasoning. Following our previous
analysis we will show that if we assume that there is only one world —and
not many, as Oxford Everettians believe—, quantum superpositions cannot be
represented in terms of the actual mode of existence.
5 Quantum Superpositions and the Actual Realm
According to the three necessary conditions imposed by representational realism,
each MOS, like the ones described in our Stern-Gerlach example of the previous
section, must be related to a representation of physical reality. However, if we
attempt to do so within the realm of actuality the conflict becomes evident. On
the one hand, the realm of actuality —determined through PE, PNC and PI—
cannot allow a physical description in terms of contradictory properties. On the
other hand, QM produces, at least within some specific contexts, contradictory
statements such as, for example, ‘the atom has the property of being decayed’
and ‘the atom has the property of being not-decayed’. But obviously, within the
actual realm of existence, an atom cannot posses both properties simultaneously,
for that would flagrantly violate PNC. According to our classical understanding,
the atom must be necessarily either ‘decayed’ or ‘not-decayed’.7
The simplest way to escape this paradox would be to argue that the proba-
bilities that accompany the states are epistemic probabilities. That would allow
7See for a detailed discussion of the paraconsistent character of quantum superpositions:
[11]. Also, for a debate regarding this interpretation: [4, 5, 15].
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us to argue that the atom is in fact, either ‘decayed’ or ‘not-decayed’; the prob-
lem would then be that we do not know which is the actual state of the atom
—implying that the atom has in fact a non-contradictory actual state. Unfortu-
natelly, orthodox QM precludes such epistemic interpretation of quantum proba-
bility (see for example [47]). As it is well known, the quantum probability arising
from the orthodox formal structure via Gleason’s theorem is non-Kolmogorovian
and does not accept an epistemic interpretation. Quantum probability simply
cannot be understood as making reference to our ignorance about an ASA.
Regardless of the formal constraints, quantum Bayesianism (QBism for short)
[29] does interpret quantum probability in epistemic terms, but this is done at
the very high cost —at least for a realist— of having to claim that “QM does
not talk about physical reality”, that it is “an algorithm” which accounts for
observations (of subjects) [28, p. 71]. Following QBism, D’Ariano and Perinotti
have explained in a recent paper [14, pp. 280-281] that: “What happens in the
Schrödinger cat thought experiment is that the nonlocal test has no intuitive
physical interpretation, since it is incompatible with all possible local obser-
vations. [...] But if one reasons operationally, it is evident that there is no
logical paradox, and the described experiment is only highly counterintuitive.”
In fact, when reasoning in operational terms, the Schrödinger cat paradox can-
not be posed. If one does not accept the premise that QM should be related
to a representation of physical reality, then the realist question regarding the
physical meaning of quantum superpositions —exposed by the superposition
problem— cannot be discussed. This is not solving the problem, it is rather
assuming a philosophical standpoint which invalidates the question regarding
the conceptual meaning of quantum superpositions.
An analogous interpretation would be to argue that quantum probabilities
need to be interpreted in terms of future events (see e.g. [50]). This response
also escapes the question at stake. The problem of interpretation of quan-
tum superpositions is not that of epistemic prediction, it is that of ontological
representation. We are not discussing here whether QM predicts the correct
measurement outcomes in an experiment —we already know it does—, we want
to understand how this occurs in terms of a conceptual physical representa-
tion. And this is why the physical explanation we seek requires necessarily a
conceptual level.
One of the first to see the difficulties of interpreting quantum superpositions
was Paul Dirac who wrote in his famous book [24]: “The nature of the relation-
ships which the superposition principle requires to exist between the states of
any system is of a kind that cannot be explained in terms of familiar physical
concepts. One cannot in the classical sense picture a system being partly in each
of two states and see the equivalence of this to the system being completely in
some other state.” Also Schrödinger made very clear, in his famous 1935 paper
[49, p. 153], the deep difficulties one is immersed in when attempting to repre-
sent quantum superpositions in terms of our classical (actualist) representation
of physical reality: “The classical concept of state becomes lost, in that at most
a well-chosen half of a complete set of variables can be assigned definite numer-
ical values.” He also remarked that the problem cannot be solved by making
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reference to epistemic uncertainty or the measurement process. “One should
note that there was no question of any time-dependent changes. It would be
of no help to permit the [quantum mechanical] model to vary quite ‘unclassi-
cally,’ perhaps to ‘jump.’ Already for the single instant things go wrong.” As
he made the point: “[...] if I wish to ascribe to the model at each moment a
definite (merely not exactly known to me) state, or (which is the same) to all
determining parts definite (merely not exactly known to me) numerical values,
then there is no supposition as to these numerical values to be imagined that
would not conflict with some portion of quantum theoretical assertions.”8
The necessity of considering the multiple terms of a quantum superposition
as physically real is supplemented by the fact that the terms ‘evolve’ and ‘inter-
act’ according to the Schrödinger equation producing specific predictions which
can be empirically tested and are in accordance to such ‘evolution’ and ‘interac-
tion’. According to our representational realist stance, such empirical findings
must be necessarily related to a physical representation of reality. Some modal
interpretations have attempted to escape this problem by arguing that one can
relate these MOS to possibilities rather than actualities [9, 22]. The problem is
that in classical physics, possibilities never interact! Only actualities are allowed
to evolve and interact with other actualities. The “interaction of possibilities”
is an idea that simply makes no sense within the classical actualist Newtonian
representation of physical reality. In classical physics, possibilities are always
epistemic possibilities. As Dieks makes the point:
“In classical physics the most fundamental description of a physical sys-
tem (a point in phase space) reflects only the actual, and nothing that
is merely possible. It is true that sometimes states involving probabil-
ities occur in classical physics: think of the probability distributions ρ
in statistical mechanics. But the occurrence of possibilities in such cases
merely reflects our ignorance about what is actual. The statistical states
do not correspond to features of the actual system (unlike the case of the
quantum mechanical superpositions), but quantify our lack of knowledge
of those actual features. This relates to the essential point of difference
between quantum mechanics and classical mechanics that we have already
noted: in quantum mechanics the possibilities contained in the superposi-
tion state may interfere with each other. There is nothing comparable in
classical physics. In statistical mechanics the possibilities contained in ρ
evolve separately from each other and do not have any mutual influence.
Only one of these possibilities corresponds to the actual situation. The
above (putative) argument for the reality of modalities can therefore not
be repeated for the case of classical physics.” [23, pp. 124-125]
The fact that quantum possibilities do interact is, according to us, the main
mystery introduced by the theory of quanta. The Humean interpretation pro-
posed by Dieks in the same paper [Op. cit.] —which only considers the events
8[Op. cit., p. 156].
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predicted by QM— seems to us an empiricist escape which does not address the
representational realist superposition problem defined above.
All the just mentioned interpretations shift the debate from the conceptual
meaning of a mathematical element of the theory to the possibility of predic-
tion given that same formal element. But as we argued above, for a realist,
prediction is not explanation. Fortunately, there is also a vast literature com-
posed by two main lines of research which investigate the possibility to consider
quantum superpositions from realist perspectives. The first line is related to
the idea that each term in a superposition relates to the existence of a “world”,
“branch”, “mind” or “history”. Examples of these interpretations are Everett’s
many worlds interpretation [48, 54] the many minds variant proposed by Albert
and Lower [3], the consistent histories interpretation proposed by Griffiths [30]
and the decoherent variant by Gell-Mann, Hartle [32] and Omnès [45]. Even
though this family of interpretations might seem to provide an answer to the
measurement problem arguing that actual reality is multiple, they still have two
serious problems to confront. The first is the basis problem, which attempts to
justify the subjective choice of a particular “preferred” basis between the many
incompatible ones. The proposed solution to this problem in terms of the pro-
cess of decoherence has found serious criticisms [13, 40]. The second problem
is the interpretation of probability, which according to the orthodox formalism
is incompatible with an epistemic interpretation. Following Everett’s epistemic
viewpoint regarding measurement, Deutsch and Wallace [19, 53] have proposed
to join QBism and interpret quantum probability as a subjective epistemic be-
lief of “rational agents” or “users” —like Mermin prefers to call them [43]. This
proposal also confronts very serious difficulties [38]. Others like Griffiths, un-
derstand the probability related to the terms in a superposition simply as a
“tool” to calculate outcomes [31]. The main problem surrounding the epistemic
and instrumentalists interpretations of probability within supposedly realist in-
terpretations of QM is that they provide no conceptual understanding of the
weird interaction of probable states described by the theory. Once again, using
a formal scheme that “works” and provides the correct measurement outcomes in
probabilistic terms, is clearly very different from understanding and represent-
ing what is really going on according to the theory. The ontological question
about what there is (independently of subjects) according to a theory obvi-
ously cannot be solved from an epistemic viewpoint which assumes the opposite
standpoint —according to which theories only make reference to the prediction
of observations (by subjects).
The second realist line of research investigates the idea of the existence of
indefinite properties described in terms of propensities, dispositions, potential-
ities, possibilities or latencies. There are many different examples of this large
family of interpretations. Let us mention at least some of them. Heisenberg’s
potentiality interpretation developed in terms of operational quantum logic by
Piron and Aerts [1, 46], Popper’s propensity interpretation and Margenau’s la-
tency interpretation presently developed by Suarez, Dorato and Esfeld [26], the
modal interpretations of Dieks and Bub [21, 9], and the more recent transac-
tional interpretation of Kastner [39]. However, all these interpretations share a
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common difficulty. As remarked by Dorato himself with respect to dispositions:
“[...] dispositions express, directly or indirectly, those regularities of the
world around us that enable us to predict the future. Such a predictive
function of dispositions should be attentively kept in mind when we will
discuss the ‘dispositional nature’ of microsystems before measurement,
in particular when their states is not an eigenstate of the relevant ob-
servable. In a word, the use of the language of ‘dispositions’ does not
by itself point to a clear ontology underlying the observable phenomena,
but, especially when the disposition is irreducible, refers to the predictive
regularity that phenomena manifest. Consequently, attributing physical
systems irreducible dispositions, even if one were realist about them, may
just result in more or less covert instrumentalism.” [25, p. 4] (emphasis
added)
This deep criticism to dispositions can be easily extended to the description
of indefinite properties in terms of propensities, possibilities and potentialities.
The reason is that the just mentioned interpretations end up defining propen-
sities, possibilities and potentialities exactly in the same way as it is done by
dispossitionalists, namely, in terms of the future actualization of measurement
outcomes. And for this reason, they all fall pray of Dorato’s criticism. The lack
of a (conceptual) categorical definition of these notions does not allow to imag-
ine what these strange indefinite properties amount to beyond their predictive
capacity regarding future observations. But let us recall, it is the conceptual
level which the representational realist considers as a necessary element for the
production of a closed theory. Without conceptual representation there is no
explanation of what physical reality amounts to, and thus the main question
remains also unanswered.
Both of these general lines of research have concentrated their efforts in try-
ing to solve the measurement problem. None of these general schemes break
with the actualist understanding of physical reality. While the former line of
research attempts to restore classicality by multiplying our world into a multi-
verse of many (un-observable) branching worlds, minds or histories; the latter
introduces potential, propensity or dispositional type properties explicitly de-
fined in terms of their future actualization. As remarked by Dorato this solution
seems to result in nothing else than “more or less covert instrumentalism”. Both
lines have deep problems in order to meet the requirements of a representational
realist project according to which the understanding of QM requires an explicit
conceptual and categorical description of what physical reality is according to
the theory beyond the mere reference to measurement outcomes or abstract
mathematical structures.
A detailed analysis of these interpretations exceeds the space of this paper
which we leave for a future work. In the present paper we attempt to consider
a radically different path. That is, to address the question of how to extend the
notion of reality in order to produce an objective description of physical reality
in accordance with the orthodox formalism of QM. The price we are willing to
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pay is the abandonment of a metaphysical equation which has become a silent
dogma within philosophy of physics, the idea that ‘Reality = Actuality’.
6 Representing Quantum Superpositions Beyond
the Actual Realm
Today, experimentalists in laboratories are playing with superpositions and en-
tanglement all around the world. Physicists are developing a new era of quantum
technology far away from the measurement problem. It is in fact this praxis of
physicists which should call our attention as philosophers of QM. How are quan-
tum superpositions being treated by physicists in the lab? We believe this is an
important question we should definitely consider. After more than one century
of not being able to interpret QM in terms of the actualist representation of
“classical reality”, it might be time we admitted that QM confronts us with the
fact that the classical representation of physics might not be the end of the
road. We might be in need of abandoning physical representation exclusiveley
in terms of “classical reality” (see for discussion [16]).
Quantum superpositions ‘evolve’ and ‘interact’ according to the Schrödinger
equation of motion. Their MOS can be empirically tested in the lab through the
Born rule. But when in physics a mathematical element of a theory ‘evolves’, ‘in-
teracts’ and ‘can be predicted’ according to a mathematical formalism, then —
always from a representational realist perspective— the elements of such math-
ematical expression need to be related (in some way) to physical reality through
specific physical notions which are capable of producing a coherent counterfac-
tual discourse and representation of physical reality (NC2 and NC3). Newton
was capable of explaining the movement of the planets in the sky and the bodies
on Earth through the creation of specific concepts such as ‘inertia’, ‘absolute
space’, ‘absolute time’, ‘mass’, etc. After centuries, these concepts became —to
great extent— part of our “common sense” representation of the world. Also
Maxwell was capable of explaining many different experiments and equations
through the introduction of the notions of ‘electromagnetic filed’ and ‘charge’.
In the case of QM, we know that each quantum superposition is related to a
specific set of MOS within a particular measurement context. However, we do
not understand what they represent in conceptual terms. We do not know what
do they refer to.
Superpositions impose a difficult crossroad when attempting to interpret the
orthodox formalism of QM. So it seems, either the formalism should be changed
in order to restore “classical reality”, or we should create a new understanding of
physical reality itself beyond the constraints imposed by the classical actualist
representation of physics —which boil down to the metaphysical scheme imposed
through PE, PNC and PI. The latter path implies taking seriously the logical
possibility that ‘Quantum Physical Reality 6= Actuality’. A first step that we
propose in this direction is to reconsider the meaning of element of physical
reality beyond actuality (certainty).
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Indeed, our representational realist stance seems to force us, given the pre-
dictions provided by QM, to extend the realm of what is considered to be real.
Since both certain (probability equal to unity) and statistical (probability be-
tween zero and unity) predictions about physical quantities provide empirical
knowledge, we believe there is no reason —apart from dogmatism regarding
actualist metaphysics— not to relate both predictions to physical reality. This
means we need to be creative enough to produce a new understanding of prob-
ability in terms of objective knowledge, abandoning its classical understanding
in terms of ignorance about an ASA.
If we accept the challenge of representational realism and admit that quan-
tum superpositions must be related to a conceptual level of description, then
there are two main mathematical elements we need to conceptually represent in
terms of objective physical concepts. Firstly, we need to provide a clear repre-
sentation of the kets that constitute each quantum superposition —orthodoxly
interpreted through their one-to-one relation to projection operators as proper-
ties of a quantum system. Secondly, we need to explain the physical meaning
of the numbers that accompany the kets —orthodoxly interpreted as related to
the probability of finding the respective property. If we were able to extend
the limits of what can be considered as physically real, we might be also able
to open the door to a new understanding of QM beyond the orthodox classical
reference to ‘systems’, ‘states’ and ‘properties’.
But how to extend physical reality beyond the limits of the actual realm?
We believe that a good starting point would be the generalization of Einstein’s
realist definition of an element of physical reality in [27]. The famous definition
by Einstein reads as follows:
Einstein’s (Actual) Element of Physical Reality: If, without in any way
disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to
unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of reality
corresponding to that quantity.
As remarked by Aerts and Sassoli [2, p. 20]: “the notion of ‘element of reality’ is
exactly what was meant by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, in their famous 1935
article. An element of reality is a state of prediction: a property of an entity
that we know is actual, in the sense that, should we decide to observe it (i.e., to
test its actuality), the outcome of the observation would be certainly success-
ful.” Indeed, certainty, taken as the condition of possibility to make reference to
the actual realm, has been up to the present the restrictive constraint of what
can be considered as part of physical reality. Our redefinition must keep the
relation imposed between predictive statements and physical reality, but leaving
aside both the actualist constraint imposed by certainty —restricting existence
only to probability equal to unity— and the focus in the process of measure-
ment —which should be only regarded as confirming or disconfirming a specific
prediction of the theory. Taking into account these general remarks we propose
the following generalization:
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Generalized Element of Physical Reality: If we can predict in any way
(i.e., both probabilistically or with certainty) the value of a physical quantity,
then there exists an element of reality corresponding to that quantity.
The problem is now clearly framed: we need to find a physical concept that is
capable of being statistically defined in objective terms. That means to find a
notion that is not defined in terms of yes-no experiments (as it is the case of
classical properties), but is defined instead in terms of a probabilistic measure. Of
course, this first step must be accompanied by developing a network of physical
notions that account for what QM is talking about —beyond measurement and
mathematical structures. In the end, our new non-classical physical scheme will
also have to be capable of taking into account the main features brought in by
the orthodox formalism.
According to our representational realist stance, mathematical structures are
not capable of providing by themselves a physical representation of a theory.
As we argued above, physical theories are also necessarily related to a network
of specific physical concepts. Mathematical structures provide a quantitative
understanding about phenomena. But this mathematical description does not
provide the qualitative understanding produced by physical notions. Thus, until
we do not find a conceptual scheme which coherently relates to the orthodox
formalism we will no be able to say we have understood QM.
We believe it is possible to come up with a physical network of concepts that
take into account the non-classical features of QM. The price to pay may-be the
abandonment of the attempt to explain the theory of quanta in terms of “com-
mon sense” or the the classical Newtonian metaphysics of actuality. This aban-
donment might allow us to construct a new non-classical metaphysical scheme
with physical concepts specifically designed in order to account for the orthodox
formalism of QM. We know of no reason to believe this is not doable.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we criticized the dogmatic constrains of the orthodox literature
in order to discuss and analyze the quantum formalism in general, and more
specifically, quantum superpositions. From a representational realist stance, we
argued in favor of the necessity to consider a conceptual representational level
defined through a metaphysical architectonic which describes quantum super-
positions beyond the reference to mathematical structures and measurement
outcomes. We have also provided a formal redefinition of quantum superpo-
sitions which takes into account their contextual nature. We presented three
necessary conditions for any objective physical representation and presented the
superposition problem which, contrary to the measurement problem, focuses on
the conceptual interpretation of superpositions themselves. We provided argu-
ments which point in the direction of considering quantum superpositions as
real physical existents. In the final part of the paper we discussed, firstly, why
the actualist interpretations fail to provide such a representation, and secondly,
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the possibility of producing a physical representation beyond the constraints
imposed by the classical metaphysics of actuality.
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